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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of gambling addiction in a dynamic model where
wellbeing crucially depends on the accumulation of relational goods which is weak-
ened by the consumption of gambling. We outline conditions under which gambling
may become addictive leading to a suboptimal equilibrium from a social point of view.
We examine the relative eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent policy solutions (tax on gambling,
gambling restrictions) in bridging the distance between the equilibrium without inter-
vention and social optimum.
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1 Introduction
In the neuroscience literature (see among others Potenza, 2008 and Ross, 2010) Pathological
Gambling (from now on PG) is considered as a form of addiction (and violation of the
rationality paradigm) since the pathological gambler "takes pains to engage in an activity
that transparently has negative expected returns if utility varies positively with money. He
also, typically, spends further resources on commitment devices designed to interfere with
her gambling"(Ross, 2010). The association between PG and classic (substance) addiction
is therefore particularly strong and, consequently, the more general addiction literature may
be an important background to study the PG phenomenon.
The origins of the economic literature on addiction trace back to the pioneering con-
tributions of Stigler and Becker (1977), Iannacone (1986) and Becker and Murphy (1988)
who actually start from the consideration that addiction and economic rationality are not
necessarily mutually exclusive.
In Becker and Murphy (1988) rational agents, despite recognizing the addictive nature of
their choices, still perform them because future addiction makes expected gains from gam-
bling higher than their costs. Nevertheless, paying the full price of addictive consumption
goods acts as a deterrent since it represents not only a current monetary cost but also a
permanent expected decrease in wealth due to the future expected gambling expenditure
generated by addiction.
Gruber and Koszegi (2001) develop a model of addiction with time-inconsistent agents,
while Gul and Pesendorfer (2007) a model where consumption of the addictive good is
a tempting choice that erodes self-control in the future. Both papers agree with Becker
and Murphy and document the eﬀectiveness of interventions based on raising the price
of addictive goods such as smoking, alcohol and heroin when they successfully reduce the
demand for them.
In the past two decades there has been a signiﬁcant increase in academic interest con-
cerning gambling behavior and, with it, the economic and social impacts of legal gambling,
as a special case of the addiction literature. However, to our knowledge, only a relatively
small portion of gambling research has been performed in economic disciplines (see, among
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others, Walker, 2008). In this respect Bardsley (1998) devises a dynamic game in continuous
time between the seller and the consumer of an addictive substance while Hartley and Far-
rell (2002) investigate the ability of the expected utility theory to account simultaneously
for gambling and insurance.
We aim to contribute to this literature with a model of rational addiction applied to gam-
bling by taking into account the diﬀerent eﬀects that addiction has on both the consumption
of the addictive good and, at the same time, the consumption of relational goods/stimulus
goods1. Based on this theoretical background, our paper also analyzes the relative eﬀective-
ness of diﬀerent policy remedies to the gambling problem and, in doing so, it deals with the
well-known and general issue of paternalism and of the boundaries between what should be
legal and what not. With this respect our work is related to some recent papers speciﬁcally
analyzing the role of the state and gambling legalization. An example is the contribution
of Walker and Jackson (2011) who examine the overall impact of legalized casino gambling
on government revenues. The authors show that, despite the economic beneﬁts that casi-
nos provide in terms of additional tax revenues, a relevant amount of social costs is also
generated. According to Layton and Worthington (2011) the United States successfully
extracted more than 9.78% of total state taxation from gambling. Unfortunately, these
revenues are not produced without some undesirable socio-economic problems such as the
relative detriment of low income individuals and the increasing need for public support
programs (Szakmary and Szakmary, 1995; Madhusudhan, 1996; Rivenbark and Rounsav-
ille, 1996, Kearney, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence that certain forms of gambling
may create compulsive gambling and major addiction, attract criminal elements and foster
corruption (Mason, Shapiro and Borg, 1989; Mikesell and Pirog-Good, 1990). Treating ad-
dicts, supporting families in diﬃculty, ﬁghting crime structured around PG, are activities
that generate high ﬁnancial costs which are mainly supported by local structures (munic-
ipalities, local health authorities, police forces), but the same activities may also cause a
1In doing so we substantially develop a Scitovskian intuition (Scitovsky, 1976) on the correlation between
comfort goods (goods that are not limited to, but may include also those producing dependence) and
wellbeing from stimulus goods which can be enjoyed only after proper consumption/investment on the
latter, while weakened by the consumption of comfort goods
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decrease in the national budget as the epidemic progresses.
In the second part of our paper we aim to take into account the role of government
against the adverse eﬀects of gambling. In this respect, we focus on two possible alternative
government policies. The ﬁrst one is based on a price increase while the second one on
limitations to gambling opportunities. We found that the second alternative can lead to
more eﬃcient results when the government is not myopic and takes into account social
losses from gambling.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we describe the main features of our
model and discuss its equilibrium characteristics. In Section 3 we model the social costs
of gambling for "passive" members in the same household. In Section 4 we compare the
two possible alternative policies and in Section 5 we argue how the policymaker trade-oﬀ
between gambling revenues and wellbeing may be aﬀected in favour of the latter by the
bottom-up action of citizens. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model borrows extensively from Dragone et al. (2015) and assumes that a rational
agent chooses, given her budget constraint, how much to consume of:
i) a good s which creates addiction (i.e. gambling with slot machines)2;
ii) a relational good r;
iii) a standard composite numerary consumption good q with unit price.
From a dynamic point of view the agent's utility also depends on a variable a representing
addiction to gambling and the accumulation of well-being from the good w depending on past
and current consumption of (investment in) r and decreasing over time with the consumption
gambling. Assuming that both a(t) and w(t) have the same positive rate of decay δ we
have that a evolves over time depending on current gambling choices and addiction from
2For convenience we consider ps a positive price by reasonably assuming that the expected value of
gambling is negative as it usually occurs when playing with slot machines (ie. if playing 10 euros gives a
1/1000 probability of winning 1000 euros, the expected loss of such play is 9 euros and ps=9).
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gambling activity accumulated in the past: a˙(t) = s(t)− δa(t)3 while w is ruled by: w˙(t) =
r(t)− δw(t)− εs(t), where ε is a positive constant.
In particular, we analyze the diﬀerent preferences of individuals characterized by greater
attachment to the pleasure of gambling, considering the total utility as a quasi-linear
weighted sum of three parts
αU(s(t), a(t)) + βU(r(t), w(t)) + U(q(t))
where individuals give higher weight to the utility from gambling (α > β) and as in Dragone
(2015), U(q(t)) = q(t) for simplicity. U(s(t), a(t)) and U(r(t), w(t)) are assumed to be
continuously diﬀerentiable, with negative second order derivatives (Uss, Uaa, Urr, Uww < 0).
For simplicity and without lack of generality preferences for gambling are incorporated in
the Us > 0 assumption.
Following Dragone et al.(2015), we deﬁne reinforcement the case where, the more a
person is addicted to gambling, the more he desires to consume the addictive good, so that
the marginal utility of consuming an addictive good increases with past consumption of that
good, that is, Usa > 0. On the other side, tolerance means that utility from a given amount
of consumption is lower when past consumption is greater, implying that Ua < 0 for a > 0.
We also assume that r displays "virtuous" reinforcement eﬀects in well-being accumulation,
hence Urw > 0.
In a continuous-time inﬁnite horizon optimization problem, the individual chooses the
optimal levels of s and r, by solving the following intertemporal problem
max
(s,r)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[αU(s(t), a(t)) + βU(r(t), w(t)) + U(q(t))]dt (1)
constaint to
M = q(t) + pss(t) (2)
a˙(t) = s(t)− δa(t), a(0) = a0 (3)
w˙(t) = r(t)− δw(t)− εs(t), w(0) = w0 (4)
3The negative depreciation rate in the law of motion of addiction implies that addiction may slowly fall
and be eliminated if it is not reinforced by further gambling "investment".
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s(t) ≥ 0, w(t) > 0 and a(t) > 0.
Equation (2) is the usual budget constraint where M represents the individual's income
(that we assume is the only source of wealth) and ps is the price to partecipate to game s.
The diﬀerential equations (3) and (4) represent the stock-ﬂow dynamics related to the two
goods. In essence, the diﬀerence between the two are that, while the eﬀect of accumulation
of r produces a utility, the eﬀect of addiction produces per se both a disutility and a
reinforcement of the utility arising from further consumption for a.
For simplicity, omitting the time index, we obtain the following current-value Hamilto-
nian function and the related ﬁrst order conditions on the state and costate variables4:
H = αU(s, a) + βU(r, w) +M − pss+ µ(s− a) + λ(r − s− δw)
βUr = −λ (5)
αUs − ps = −µ+ λε (6)
µ˙ = (ρ+ δ)µ− αUa (7)
λ˙ = (ρ+ δ)λ− βUw (8)
and the transversality condition:
lim
t→∞ e
−ρt[µ(t)a(t) + λ(t)r(t)] = 0
Diﬀerentiating equations (5) and (6) with respect to time t, we get
β(Urr r˙ + Urww˙) = −λ˙ (9)
α(Usss˙+ Usaa˙) = −µ˙+ λ˙ε. (10)
Since in steady state a˙ = 0, w˙ = 0, substituting λ˙ from equation (8) and λ from equation
(5) in (9) and proceding in the same way on equation (10) exploiting equations (7) and (6)
we derive the following system
r˙ =
1
Urr
[(ρ+ δ)Ur + Uw]
4The costate variables µ and λ, associated to a and w respectively, represent the shadow value of past
gambling experiences and of well-being arising from the enjoyment of r, i.e. how much the value of the
objective function changes when there is a marginal variation in those variables
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s˙ =
1
αUss
{−βε[(ρ+ δ)Ur + Uw] + αUa − (ρ+ δ)(−αUs + ps − βUrε)}
s(t) = δa(t)
r(t) = δw(t)− εs(t)
which in steady-state reduces to
−(ρ+ δ)Ur = Uw (11)
Ua =
1
α
{(ρ+ δ)(ps − αUs) + εβUw} (12)
s(t) = δa(t) (13)
r(t) = δw(t)− εs(t) (14)
Condition (12) states that the marginal utility of addiction is equal to a weighted sum
of the utility from gambling and utility from wellbeing arising from the ability generated
by consumption of the r. Finally, conditions (13) and (14) obviously derive from the lack
of accumulation/depletion of both addiction and wellbeing from the consumption of r in
steady state5. From conditions (11)-(14) it is also clear that an agent rationally converges
to a stable situation where both the well-being is maximized and he is not addicted to
gambling (Ua = Uw = 0) in steady state, only when Us =
ps
α , that is, when the cost of
gambling is equal to the marginal utility of gambling, see (11) and (12). A gambler is aware
that Ua < 0, hence
β > −(ρ+ δ)ps − αUs
εUw
if Uw < 0. (15)
β < −(ρ+ δ)ps − αUs
εUw
if Uw > 0 (16)
Deﬁnition:Under condition, (15), a Pathological Gambler is an individual aware that Ua <
0, but nonetheless choosing an amount of gambling leading to that harmful addiction level
Us <
ps
α .
5Notice as well that equation (11) shows that well-being from w is maximized only if the consumption
of r is maximized, too. Moreover, since for Ur < 0 the agent is consuming r in excess (as decreasing time
devoted to r and engaging in comfort goods would increase her utility), this means that utility from w would
increase only for high values of r. In other words, in order to increase her well-being accumulation, the only
possibility for the agent is to consume as more r as possible or equal to the maximum level.
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We deﬁne as Pathological Gambler an individual that, even knowing that gambling
addiction is harmful (since Ua < 0 by assumption) nonetheless he increases addiction by
gambling more and choosing low levels of r since he gives high weight to the utility from
gambling and low weight to the utility from the enjoyment of the relational good. From
(12) we ﬁnd that there are three feasible equilibria satisfying the assumptions Ua < 0.
Case 1: Assume that ps − αUs > 0, that is Us < psα . Since Ua < 0 by assumption, the
second part of the sum in (12) has to be negative implying that Uw is also negative. Hence,
by (11), Ur > 0 and therefore, as a consequence, the individual is below the maximum level
of consumption of r. Hence Ua < 0 is possible only if (15) is satisﬁed. Case 1 may be
deﬁned as the case of a Pathological Gambler which consumes high quantities of s and low
quantities of r.
Case 2: Assume ps − αUs < 0 and assume that Uw < 0. This implies that Us > psα > 0.
We derive from (11) that Ur > 0. Ua < 0 is satisﬁed if (15) is satisﬁed. In this case the
individual is consuming below the maximum levels of both goods s and r.
Case 3: Assume ps − αUs < 0 and Uw > 0. This time Us > psα > 0. In this case the
individual consumes low quantities of s and high quantities of r. Ua < 0 is satisﬁed if (16)
is satisﬁed.
Remark that the higher is β, the more diﬃcult is to satisfy Ua < 0. This may be
considered the case of a "mindful" or "conscious" gambler.
Notice that in the pathological gambler equilibrium steady state, see Case 1, we have
that s = δa, that is, the consumption of s is high enough to compensate the decay of the
consumption habit. Hence the process reducing dependence does not start and this players
remain a pathological gambler6.
The intuition behind Case 1 is that the individual overconsumes gambling beyond its
maximum in terms of partial marginal utility due to the reinforcement eﬀect (Usa > 0)
6It is possible to show that (11)-(12) represent a not uncommon case of stable steady state solutions
for high enough values of α versus β, corresponding to a stable saddle point, according to conditions for a
modiﬁed Hamiltonian System as in Dockner and Feichtinger (1991), especially when we assume a quadratic
speciﬁcation which satisﬁes the assumptions made for the utility function and which allows for closed-form
solutions (i.e., for instance, by assuming (s(t), a(t)) = s(xa− s
2
)− a2
2
and U(r(t), w(t)) = r(yw − r
2
)− w2
2
.
Full details on results from this speciﬁc functional form are available upon request)
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which compensates the direct utility loss from addiction (Ua < 0) and the missed utility
arising from under consumption of r. This may occur only for very low utility weights
given to this last (β below a certain threshold). The negative side of pathological gambling
therefore lies in the consumption of something which produces per se utility (the good s) but
however generates a side eﬀect (addiction) which produces a disutility to the same individual
(Ua < 0). The net utility from the two eﬀects remains however positive. Note that, even
though we may think that it is not "healthy" to maximize in this way (due to addiction
growth) the Pathological Gambler is still rational and maximising her "total" utility (where
for total we mean the sum of its three parts). Why therefore we should stigmatize its choice?
If instead of gambling we would examine smoking we could assume that the pathological
smoker may underestimate the health costs of smoking. Again this should be a form of
irrationality (due to the incapacity of incorporating such costs in her utility function).7
3 The social costs of Pathological Gambling
Beyond the eﬀect on the gambler itself, the simplest way to model the social costs of Patho-
logical Gambling is by assuming, as we do, that the Pathological Gambler is part of a
household and that her behavior has negative externalities on the household budget and
relations. The simplest way to model it is to consider the presence of a second "passive"
member (since now on pm), i.e. an individual in the household who suﬀers from the con-
sequences of gambling of the other individuals. In fact, under the Pathological Gambling
scenario, the money available for consumption of the numerary good is reduced and this
fact has negative eﬀects on the passive household member. Moreover, we may reasonably
believe that r is a relational good which is also consumed jointly among passive household
members. In this case sa swell, gambling has direct negative consequences on the wellbeing
7An alternative motivation for government action against gambling would be that of introducing utility
misprediction in our theoretical framework. We might in other terms argue that α is overestimated, β
is underestimated and, as a consequence, the utility of the maximizing individual falls below its optimal
value due to misprediction. Theoretical rationales for utility misprediction which can be applied to our
case are thoroughly explored by Frey and Stutzer (2004). We however provide in what follows a theoretical
explanation which motivates social action without recurring to utility misprediction.
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of the other household members. Pathological Gambling becomes suboptimal in presence of
rational and maximizing gamblers when we consider their relational ties with other individ-
uals who are negatively aﬀected by their behavior. To take into account these possibilities
we make some simplifying assumptions.
First of all we assume that only two individuals exist in a given household, that is one
of them is a mindful/conscious player PM and the other one is a pathological player PG.
We assume that the conscious player has a parameter αpm in his utility of gambling which
can also be null if he doesn't like to gamble at all. At the same time, he thinks that the
relational goods are more important , so that his βpm is higher than the threshold β found
in Section 2.
The conscious player solves:
max
(s,r)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[αpmU(s(t), a(t)) + βpmU(r(t), w(t)) + U(qpm(t))dt] (17)
We denote by s∗pm the optimal level of gambling which maximizes the utility function of PM
(which it is null if he does not gamble at all), and the corresponding optimal value function
V ∗o = V (s
∗
pm, r
∗
pm, q
∗
pm). When PM is damaged by the behavior of the other individual PG,
his optimal value function V ∗l is solving the new "passive" member problem given by:
max
(s,r)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt[αpmU(s(t), a(t)) + (βpm − k(α− αpm))U(r(t), w(t)) + U(qpm(t))]dt. (18)
The utility of the passive member is reduced in terms of relational goods for a share k
proportionally to the greater devotion that the other player gives to gambling rather than
taking care of the family α−αpm. Moreover passive member's utility is less even to respect
to the quantity of the numeraire good that he can consume after having paid gambling and
consumption for the PG:
qpm =Mpm−psspm−pss∗−q. s∗ is the optimum for the PG and q is the minimum quantity
of necessary good for a PG that the pm will support for him. Here we are assuming that
PG can consume q = M − pss if he has his own monetary income M > 0, and a positive
share of the other player's income otherwise. That is, if the PG has no income 8 he can
8The PG could also borrow money at a debt ratio i which should be paid by the pm, but for simplicity
we assume that i = 0 as our results do not substantially chance with this assumption.
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still consume at least a minimum necessary share q and the desired s at a price ps if he is
borrowing money by using the available income from the pm. PM takes as given the PG
decision and he maximizes his consumption of qpm as if he had only a limited amount of
available income Mdpm which remains after having paid q and s for the PG.
In this case it is reasonable to assume he would prefer not to play at all in order to
consume more qpm. The loss, that would result, aﬀects not only the co relational goods
r and q but also his consumption of spm since he is conscious that he cannot consume
anymore.
Anyway by considering only the most relevant social costs which a Social Planner should
take into account, the passive member Welfare Loss may be measured by:
Lpm = V
∗
o − V ∗l = αkU(r) + pss ∗+q.
4 To discourage the Pathological Gambling: two alter-
natives for the government's behaviour
In this Section we argue that the government may use two diﬀerent strategies in order to
tackle gambling addiction.
The ﬁrst one aims to increase the gambling price, ps through higher taxes. They would
represent a permanent expected decrease in gambler's wealth to be taken into account in
his maximization problem.
On the other hand the second strategy is to reduce the amount of available gambling
opportunities (for instance by banning slot machines in the stores or creating limits to the
maximum amount of bets from a given machine or related to a given individual) which
implies setting up a maximum amount: 0 ≤ s < s.
First of all, we consider the policy aimed at directly aﬀecting the cost of gambling by
raising its price, for instance through the introduction of excise taxes on sellers.
We analyze its long-run eﬀects by focusing on stable steady states. We are going to show
that when the price of gambling increases, addicted gamblers do respond to incentives and
in the long-run they reduce the consumption of the addictive good when it becomes more
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expensive, i.e.
∂
∂t
∂s(t)
∂ps
< 0. (19)
To show that the above inequality holds true, following Becker ad Murphy (1988), we have
∂
∂t
∂s(t)
∂ps
=
∂s˙
∂ps
=
∂
∂ps
∂s
∂a
a˙ =
ds
da
∂a˙
∂ps
+ a˙
∂
∂ps
∂s
∂a
.
Cause of the reinforcement eﬀect for an addicted gambler dsda > 0 and since ps has a negative
eﬀect on s(t) given the budget constraint and on a˙ we have ∂a˙∂ps < 0. Finally, observing that
in steady-state dsda
∂a˙
∂ps
= 0, we derive (19).
As far as the second strategy is concearned, we model the government taking into account
its trade-oﬀ in dealing with the gambling problem. On one side, the government earns
revenues from gambling activities while, on the other side, it may be concerned about the
negative social externalities that gambling generates.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that a myopic government wants to earn a minimum amount
of revenues from gambling, 9
γpss ≥ E
where γ is the tax rate calculated as a percent amount of the price ps paid on each gambling
play and the revenues cannot fall below a certain level E.
In this case the minimum gambling opportunities ﬁxed by the myopic government, cannot
be lower than
s ≥ spm ≥ E
ps
(20)
On the contrary, for a non myopic government, aware of the trade-oﬀ between gambling rev-
enues and social externalities from gambling (which produce a level of welfare loss measured
by Lpm, the previous constraint becomes
γpss+ θLpm ≥ E
where θ is a positive parameter and with
s ≥ spm ≥ E − θLpm
γps
(21)
9This is exactly what is stated in the agreement between the Italian government and the companies which
sign the concession contract for installing slot machines in the country.
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Therefore we have a more stringent threshold and the government which takes into account
the trade-oﬀ will ﬁx a lower share of maximum gambling allowance. What may determine
this trade-oﬀ is that, on the one side, the government cares about tax revenues while, on
the other side, it considers that the sensitiveness of the public opinion to the social costs of
gambling may aﬀect its re-election10.
Notice as well that (20) and (21) coincide only when the long-run equilibrium and the
desired level of well-being coincide.
In what follows we aim to compare the diﬀerences between a far-sighted government and
a short-sighted/self-interested government. Moreover, we are interested in analyzing the
most eﬃcient strategy between a tax policy and a restriction policy.
With the tax policy in steady state, we notice a reduction in the consumption of s, when
the government ﬁxes a limit s. In fact, using (20) and replacing the steady state level of s∗
we have
s∗ > s ⇐⇒ δa∗ > E
γps
.
The greater the addiction of the PG in equilibrium a∗, the higher is the gambling con-
sumption chosen by the PG in steady state s∗. Hence, if the government ﬁxes a minimum
amount of gambling revenues E at high levels, there could not be too much diﬀerence
between the implicit maximum level of gambling allowed by the government and the one
desired by the PG. The latter is obviously much lower, the higher the price.
In the second strategy, it is much more likely that the restriction leads to a level of s
lower than the desired one since we have
s∗ > s ⇐⇒ δa∗ > E − θLpm
γps
.
What matters, ﬁxing the threshold, are three elements. First of all, the level of Lpm, a factor
which impacts negatively on the threshold that a society considers important to preserve.
10To provide an example of the trade-oﬀ in practice, in December 2013 the Italian parliament voted an
amendment to the Financial law where local administrations which enforced laws limiting gambling activities
were asked to compensate the reduced ﬁscal revenues for the government budget. The bottom-up pressure
from media and the public opinion forced the government to withdraw the amendment. Another example is
the city of New York where in November the 5th 2013 the council directly investigated citizens preferences
with a referendum on the creation of new video lottery.
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Secondly, the minimum amount of revenue E that the government aims to achieve, which
positively aﬀects the threshold. Finally, the coeﬃcients γ and δ which reduce the threshold
since they increase the entries even when gambling is strongly limited.
Now we compare a tax policy versus a restriction policy. When the government opts for
a price increase, the amount of gambling chosen in the steady-state reduces to
δa∗(1− ∂s
∗
∂ps
)
while with the second policy it is
δa∗ − E − θLpm
γps
Remark that the latter policy is more eﬃcient, in terms of amount of gambling reduced,
holding the same revenues E.
In fact it implies a higher reduction of gambling if
δa∗(1− ∂s
∗
∂ps
)− δa∗ + E − θLpm
γps
< 0
or
E − θ(αkU(r) + psδa∗ + q)
γps
< δa∗
∂s∗
∂ps
Therefore, if the government is following a restriction policy, the above condition is
certainly veriﬁed for high value of Lpm, for high value of addiction, for high values the
passive member attaches to any additional unit of r instead of s with respect to the PG,
(i.e. kUr which will be lost as PG devotes more care to gambling), and for higher values of
the mimimum amount q the PG needs to consume and he can't pay by himself.
In this case a restriction policy leads to a greater disincentive to the PG, so reducing
losses for the passive member and allows the government to save money to support these
losses.
The intuition behind our result is that gamblers' dependence reduces the eﬀectiveness
of higher prices vis-à-vis outright gambling limitations. The addicted gambler will try to
gamble even if ps is higher and the price increase may produce the paradox of further
reducing wellbeing of passive household members without limiting gambling consumption.
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This result is in line with recent empirical analysis on the eﬀects of restrictions policies
on another kind of addiction, i.e. smoking addiction, Wakeﬁeld et al.(2000) determine the
relation between extent of restrictions on smoking at home, at school and in public places
and smoking prevalence among school students. Their results suggest that more extensive
bans on smoking in public places and enforced bans on smoking at school may reduce the
number of smoking teenagers. According to Farrelly et al.(1999) having a 100% smoke-free
workplace would reduce smoking prevalence by 6% points and average daily consumption
among smokers by 14% relative to workers subject to minimal or no restrictions. Fichtenberg
and Glantz (2002)compare the eﬀects of restriction policies with those of an increase in excise
taxes and ﬁnd that smoke-free workplaces not only protect non-smokers from the dangers
of passive smoking, but also reduce consumption in more signiﬁcant portion. To obtain the
same eﬀect cigarette taxation should increase by 300%.
5 The revolution "slot mob" as a government substitute
In this Section we argue that a contribution to solve the gambling problem may be found de-
vising "bottom-up" initiatives by which "socially responsible citizens" contribute with their
action to produce "nudging" eﬀects on myopic governments . In essence, as explained in
footnote 11, the bottom up action of the public opinion may modify the government percep-
tion of the parameter θ, thereby aﬀecting its trade-oﬀ and leading to a stronger engagement
of the latter against gambling. There are several works (see for instance, Becchetti et al.,
2011; Becchetti et al.,2013) showing how a small share of consumer choices aﬀected by social
and environmental concerns signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the behaviour of proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
whose economic and ﬁnancial success depend on small changes in market shares, revenues
and proﬁts. Institutions are nonetheless aﬀected as politicians try to represent issues of
these groups not to lose their political support.
One of these important bottom-up approaches which has been recently experienced is
that of the so-called "slot-mobs"(http : //www.nexteconomia.org/slots − mob. The idea
is to create the largest possible group of citizens and to bring them to reward with their
shopping actions cafeterias which made the choice to remove slot machines from their shops.
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Since 2013 a coalition of over 70 organizations in Italy organized slot-mobs in several Italian
cities with the goal of raising awareness of the population against the risk of gambling. After
the beginning of the slot mob initiative several laws restricting gambling have been taken
in the cities in which slot-mobs were operated. What may be inferred is that slot-mobs
have raised the sensitivity of voters on the issue and thereby increased the relevance of the
parameter θ in (18), leading the government to give relatively more weight to the social
costs of gambling than to its tax revenues.
6 Conclusions
In an intertemporal continuous time model we deﬁned pathological gambling and discussed
conditions under which pathological gambling, even representing the optimal choice for the
gambler in terms of aggregate utility, produces "painful" addiction for him plus social costs.
Based on this theoretical framework we further address the issue of the optimal policies
needed to tackle this phenomenon.
In our model the pathological gambler is a rational and maximizing individual who com-
pensates the disutility arising from increasing addiction with the utility of gambling which
is enhanced by the reinforcement eﬀect of past gambling choices. Our model however pro-
vides a theoretical framework which properly takes into account social costs of pathological
gambling.
The pathological gambler is part of a household composed by a second "passive" member
whose utility depends on the other two goods available to him and the pathological gambler
(a standard numerary consumption good and a complimentary relational good). Consump-
tion of the above mentioned two goods is however reduced by the pathological gambler's
overconsumption of gambling.
A long sighted government may act on the problem in two ways. First of all, it may
increase the cost of gambling thereby reducing gambling consumption for the pathological
gambler. Secondly, it may directly reduce gambling opportunities.
In our model we demonstrate why and under which conditions the second policy is to
be preferred.
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We also discuss the role played by bottom up action of a minority of "gambling con-
cerned" individuals (as occurred with the recent wave of slot-mobs) which can raise gov-
ernment sensitivity on the issue, thereby aﬀecting the trade-oﬀ of the latter between tax
revenues from gambling and gambling restrictions.
Our theoretical framework may be a benchmark for future research on the issue. In our
model we demonstrate that the pathological gambling equilibrium occurs only when the
individual attributes extra weight to gambling activity. Since it is reasonable to assume
that advertisements on gambling may signiﬁcantly aﬀect such preference weight, a third
policy action of banning gambling propaganda may be eﬀective in prevent pathological
gambling. Also mixed policy options aﬀecting both sides of the trade-oﬀ such as those of
taxing gambling advertisements could be further explored.
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